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INTRODUCTION
Since 2005, Israel has experienced a mass influx of asylum seekers entering mostly through its Egyptian border. While Israel has been a signatory to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1 for many decades, the new Israeli asylum system enter Israel after crossing an Arab country -and in particular those who are nationals of such a country -are to be detained under emergency legislation without judicial review.
12
I will argue that these similarities between the asylum regime and the immigration and citizenship regime exist despite the numerous reasons in favor of distinguishing between the different policies. Asylum regimes should be governed by the Refugee Convention and by international humanitarian moralist principles, whereas immigration regimes should be governed by the principle of state sovereignty.
Nevertheless, in Israel, the asylum, citizenship, and immigration policies are mainly intended to exclude the "other" -the non-Jewish asylum seeker, and especially the Palestinian, the Arab, or the Muslim refugee, regardless of the circumstances that brought them to Israel. Their being is captured in a narrow sense and reduced to one overtly dominating characteristic -the national "otherness," in a manner that does not allow the "other" to be perceived as an individual, to be identified with, to be heard, or to enjoy empathy. It is against this otherness that, allegedly, the Israeli and Jewish identity are sustained and developed. Viewing the asylum seekers as "others" constitutes the collective as the anti-force and as the unit in which resources should be redistributed.
Together, the asylum, immigration, and citizenship policies sustain and enhance the existing social order, excluding or marginalizing asylum seekers (and in particular those who are Palestinian, Arab, or Muslim) and leaving them, at best, the opportunity to take 12 See Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714-1954, Passed by the Knesset on the 17th of Av, 5714 (Aug. 16, 1954) part in the Israeli society through participation in the work market in low-skilled, often undocumented, jobs.
The concept of the "other" or "otherness" is fundamental to different disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, and sociology. This concept has been interpreted and given different meanings by different scholars, with each of them emphasizing and expanding on a particular angle. Indeed, the perception of immigrants as "others," based on real or imagined differences in physical appearance, culture, norms, values, or membership, has been a basis on which ethno-cultural positions were formed. According to these differences, exclusionary decisions were made and exclusionary measures applied. 13 The "other" is, as a result of her "otherness" and her exclusion, a hybrid being, since she is physically present but not a member. 14 The "we-ness," the national identity, values, status, and so on, is constituted, reinforced, or reshaped against and with reference to the "otherness" of the "other," and the "other" challenges the "self." 15 A dichotomy of "us" and "them" 16 shapes class relations and notions of belonging, and "they" are often associated with perceptions of risks, 17 threats, 18 and chaos. 19 In Part I of this paper, I will elaborate on the Israeli immigration and citizenship regime. I will show how this regime favors and includes Jews, and discriminates and excludes non-Jews, with exclusion reaching its height when it comes to Palestinians and enemy nationals. In Part II, I will describe the difference between the immigration regime and the asylum regime. These two regimes operate under different assumptions and different sets of values. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they would be significantly different from each other. In Part III, I will describe the Israeli asylum system. As I describe the Israeli asylum regime, I will attempt to show how it resembles the immigration and citizenship regime and follows its logic to a large extent. I will also explain how, under the asylum regime, the refugee is portrayed as the "other," with Palestinian and Arab asylum seekers being the most extreme embodiment of "otherness."
I. THE ISRAELI IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP REGIME: ADVANTAGED JEWISH
DESCENDENTS, DISADVANTAGED PALESTINIANS
It is important to understand Israel's asylum regime in light of its immigration and citizenship norms. In short, these norms can be categorized as benefitting Jews and extremely disadvantaging and excluding Arabs and Palestinians. The purpose of those norms is to strengthen the Jewish "we-ness," and to form a collective Israeli nationhood, against the threats posed by the "other" -the non-Jewish and, in particular, the Arab and the employment market. It is against the exclusion of the "other" that the Jewish "self" is formed and sustained.
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III. BETWEEN THE IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP REGIME AND THE ASYLUM REGIME It is interesting to compare Israel's immigration and citizenship regime with the asylum regime, since the underlying logic of these two systems is supposed to be so fundamentally different. The reason for the distinction is that while immigration is restricted by the principle of state sovereignty, asylum is governed by international law obligations.
With respect to immigration, as sovereign entities, states are currently perceived to be entitled to decide who to include and who to exclude from their territories, with international law restrictions playing a minimal role in the decision-making process. The sovereign power of states also enables them to close their borders and to banish undesired intruders. Typically, states allow immigration when, and to the extent that, it meets the self-interests of their nations. In fact, states are perceived to have the right -and perhaps even the duty -to do just that. This is the reason immigration issues are debated in the political arena and are often determinative of election results. In the case of Israel, the self-interest of the state in maintaining a certain identity and demographic balance shapes these decisions.
While immigration policy is governed by the principle of sovereignty, refugee law is an exception that is governed by international law obligations. Israel was one of the framing states of the Refugee Convention and had a serious interest in seeing that it materialized, especially because it was perceived to be potentially denied freedom of movement. He is also often quote saying, "Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day on small wages which he acquires?" See David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in HUME'S MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 363-364 (Henry David Aiken ed., 1948). It should be noted that Hume made this remark in the context of a discussion about the duty to obey the law. 59 On the concept of necessity in immigration, see NIRAJ NATHWANI, RETHINKING REFUGEE LAW 27-28 (2003) . 60 Refugee Convention, supra note 1 at arts. 1(A)(2) and 1(C), which refers to a person "who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence." This exception to the cessation of status was originally intended to apply to Holocaust refugees, but it was recently purposively interpreted by the UNHCR to "cover cases where refugees, or their family members, have suffered atrocious forms of persecution and therefore cannot be expected to return to the country of origin or former habitual residence." UNHCR "Guidelines on given to other temporary stayers or persons in the process of naturalization in Israel.
When status is concerned, the uniqueness of the circumstances that led to its being 65 Regulations, supra note 11. It should be noted that although these norms have been referred to as regulations in the literature, they are, in fact, internal procedures -that is, of inferior normative power than regulations. I will refer to them as regulations, despite the inaccuracy, for the sake of consistency. Under the current refugee regime, which was established under the administrative procedure in 2001 by an intergovernmental committee, Israel is not fully involved in the status determination process. Instead, since 2002, the initial screening of asylum applications is completed by the UNHCR representative to Israel, who makes a recommendation on each case and delivers it to an inter-ministerial committee called the National Status Granting Body (NSGB). This committee, which includes representatives from the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Interior, in turn makes a recommendation to the Minister of Interior, who has the authority to grant the request and give status to the asylum seeker. This process lasts a few monthsand in some cases, years -during which time the asylum seeker is given a letter from the UNHCR that gives her protection from removal and deportation and, in some cases, also permission to work. . The abovemention status determination process has many procedural flaws. Notably, asylees do not have a right to be represented by an attorney before the UNHCR or the committee. In addition, the possibility to appeal a decision is very limited, because the reasons for rejecting an asylum request are either not given to asylees or are only briefly stated. Appeals are heard by the same persons in the UNHCR correspondent office who made the original decision. Finally, many asylum seekers don't know about the asylum procedure, due to the fact that it was never published; etc. 66 This does not mean that the Refugee Convention does not have any legal meaning in Israel. The regulations refer to the Refugee Convention. Israeli Courts, as they interpret legislation, will always prefer to interpret it in a way that conforms to the Refugee Convention, rather than interpreting it in a way that contradicts the Refugee Convention, due to a "conformity presumption. Also, the inability to obtain permanency prevents refugees from finding a much needed sense of stability in their lives.
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More importantly, the application of the existing regulations is often suspended, as the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process is not conducted with respect to most asylum seekers, with persons from specific countries of nationality not being granted access to the Israeli asylum system. Essentially, nationals of countries of origin from which a large number of asylum seekers come are not being processed through the RSD 69 While this could potentially be a positive step that prevents discrimination, it also prevents affirmative action, such as the taking into consideration of the special trauma, hardship, and physical difficulties the refugees have gone through. 70 There are no legal barriers to the minister of interior naturalizing a refugee, but the minister has never exercised his discretion to do so. 71 On the connection between citizenship, refugee status, and rights, see HANNA ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM, 292-293 (1973 73 All asylum seekers in Israeli are eligible to receive emergency health care. Moreover, if they receive a work permit and are employed, they are entitled to private health insurance, which is paid for by their employers, and some social security benefits. Children of asylum seekers are eligible for discounted and partially state-sponsored private health insurance and are allowed to join the education system. Many asylum seekers are not granted a formal work permit, either until the completion of the initial status of their Refugee Status Determination or at all, and support themselves by seeking undocumented employment or by depending on charity. Recognized refugees receive the same rights as temporary residents, and as such are included in the national health insurance system and eligible for more social security benefits. It seems that the case of social and economic rights of asylum seekers and refugees reflects the general situation of social and economic rights in Israel, which are uncodified and, due to lack of consensus on their scope, not specifically included in Israel system. 75 I will expand on this below, as I refer to the group protection extended to those persons.
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The result of not being able to acquire official recognition as a refugee is that refugees are exposed to frequently changing policies and do not enjoy a stable, formal status. Most of the refugees are left exposed, in legal limbo, though they apply for status and hope to undergo RSD. In an effort to give them some protection from detention and deportation, the UNHCR has developed an elaborate system of quasi-official protection papers that are handed out to asylum seekers. 77 Those papers are often -though not always -respected as proof of a person's need for UNHCR protection, and only occasionally do mass detentions and anecdotal deportations of persons with UNHCR protection papers occur. In addition, these quasi-official papers do not grant participation in the Israeli welfare state, nor do they allow documented employment. Being caught in this state of legal limbo, and having to make ends meet, refugees are therefore pushed to find undocumented employment.
As can be inferred from the description above, the presence of refugees in Israel is chaotic. 78 They are physically present in Israel, but legally absent, to a large extent, as they lack formal status and welfare rights, in most cases. As mentioned above, most asylum seekers are not processed through the RSD system. Instead they are granted a group-based and often informal temporary protection.
Group-based informal temporary protection was granted even in the earlier days prior to the formation of the Israeli asylum system. 80 But even after the asylum system The tendency to provide temporary protection rather than the kind of protection the Refugee Convention requires is common in many countries today. 85 Temporary protection provides protection to persons who may not have received protection otherwise, as they do not fall under the definition of "refugee." Nevertheless, temporary protection is critiqued since it grants essentially fewer rights to all of those protected (some of whom could have received a broader set of rights had they had access to the RSD system, rather than to the temporary protection system). 86 Additional critique points to the fact that whereas there must be clear standards for the termination of the protection of refugees, 87 there are no such standards for the termination of temporary protection.
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Therefore, while Israel grants temporary protection, at the same time it also prevents persons from certain countries of origin from having access to the rights that they would enjoy had they been recognized as refugees and ensures that their protection is easy to terminate.
In addition to ensuring the complex inclusion/exclusion situation of protected persons, granting temporary protection also allows states to avoid dealing with individual persons, since they are dealt with as members of their group of nationality. Individuals do not need to tell their stories and establish a well-founded fear of persecution; rather, they . 86 Id. at 291 ff. 87 Refugee Convention, supra note 1 at art. 1(C). 88 Fitzpatrick, supra note 85 at 300 ff.
rather their existence is narrowed down to a single identity-dimension: their nationality. It is this identity-dimension that determines their status and rights, sustains their "otherness," and prevents them from ever being perceived as anything but the "other."
This corresponds to the literature on the concept of "master status," a term referring to the classification of people into specific social categories based on a single social label, which ultimately delimits their social mobility and ascribes traits, rights, and values to them. 89 Perhaps as a result, the group-based perception of refugees also prevents seeing their value as potentially contributing members of society. Instead, emphasis is put on the burdens involved in the protection of these groups of refugees. 90 The perception of refugees as masses has led to terming their arrival a "tsunami." 91 Information, and sometimes misinformation, about quantities and numbers is often used. The motivation behind the arrival of refugees to Israel is questioned and suspected, and they are often called "work infiltrators." In a sense, this resembles the victim-plaintiff distinction Lyotard stretches in the differend situation. 92 Asylum seekers are unable to present the wrongs that were done to them; they are silenced and disallowed from speaking since they are not given access to the RSD process; they are not believed since their unheard testimonies are perceived to be, a priori, fictitious and to cover a reality of economic 101 These restrictions also disrupt the ability of refugee communities to exist. As these visa-like papers were distributed, no special consideration was given to the particular constraints or circumstances of individuals, forcing many individuals to quit their long sought-after jobs, children to drop out of schools, ill individuals to discontinue medical treatment, residents in rented apartments to break their contracts, and so on.
Whether intentionally or unintentionally, the freedom of movement restrictions render refugees marginalized and excluded, and allowed presence only in the periphery, away from the public eye. Also, these restrictions reflect the notion that refugees need to be curbed, restrained, and contained even after their release from detention.
d. The Enemy National and Palestinian Refugee as the Embodiment of the "Other"
The most "other" of them all is the refugee whose country of origin is an enemy country or the Palestinian refugee.
possess that status. The issue of the release of such persons on bail will be examined on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the prevailing circumstances, and security considerations. Israel appreciates the UNHCR's position according to which UNHCR will make every effort to find a country of resettlement for such refugees, pending a comprehensive settlement in the region.
The exclusion of Palestinian asylum seekers is due both to the above-mentioned 110 and it allows the exclusion of refugees solely on the basis of the individual danger they pose. 111 In this sense, the perceived "otherness" of those refugees coincides with a perceived (or maybe even imagined) "risk."
In a sense, as Kemp and Goldin confer from Lupton's arguments on "risk" and "otherness," 112 what is perceived to be a "risk" is perceived as such because of its "other" -and what is perceived to be the "other" is perceived as such because of its risk.
Refugees are perceived as the "enemy other" not necessarily because of any intrinsic flaw within them, but rather because of their being outsiders to the statist legal order and different from the state's nationals. 113 It should be mentioned that this presumption of the dangerousness of "enemy nationals" has never been lifted, despite the prolonged presence of many asylum seekers, none of whom has ever been suspected of involvement in security-related matters. The presumption has been somewhat relaxed, as enemy national asylum seekers have been released from detention over the course of time.
Second, Israeli officials have made remarks that if asylum seekers are given status in Israel, then more will be motivated to come to Israel. This reasoning has been applied with respect to all asylum seekers, but it has had special force in relation to enemy national asylum seekers, because their immigration imposes security-related costs and their countries of origin are undemocratic and oppressive. Therefore, there is a reason to assume many enemy nation asylum seekers would be inclined to try to leave their countries of origin. This reasoning also has special force with respect to enemy nationals who are sur place refugees, who become such upon their entry into Israel. 114 According to these officials, granting status to asylum seekers and refugees will be a "pull factor,"
encouraging additional migration to Israel. There is a concern, according to those officials, that increased immigration would impose a burden on Israel's economy and negatively effect its efforts maintain its Jewish majority and its Jewish identity. Again, this concern follows the logic of the immigration and citizenship regime, especially the logic behind the Law of Return 115 and the refusal to recognize a right of return of Palestinian refugees. 116 All this despite the fact that the Refugee Convention does not allow for the balancing of commitments to refugees against demographic considerations.
The physical presence of the enemy national is almost unchallenged. Generally, Israel refrains from forcefully returning these asylum seekers to their countries of origin. 117 Also, although initially Israel tried to resettle enemy nationals in safe third countries, it is currently unable and unwilling to do so, given the scope of the phenomenon and a lack of desire to encourage further immigration from these countries by institutionalizing resettlement solutions.
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However, despite the obvious and rather stable physical presence of enemy national refugees in Israel, their legal and social presence is compromised, 119 both as a result of their perceived otherness and as a reinforcement of it. A series of obstacles prevents enemy nationals from integrating into Israeli society. First, because enemy nationals are governed by the above-mentioned legal norms, their asylum applications are not processed, and they are unable to receive protection based on their individual fear of being persecuted. As a result, most enemy nationals are left in legal limbo, 120 finding undocumented employment or being employed through informal arrangements between governments and employers. 121 Second, enemy nationals are treated as a group, not as individuals. This is apparent since they are viewed through the prism of a generalized presumption of dangerousness. Since a list of enemy countries for the purpose of these regulations has never been formed, it seems that the decision of who is "the enemy" is dependent, in large, on the question of who is asking for asylum. In other words, rather than being perceived as nationals of particular countries, they are viewed as the "enemy other." The only case of enemy nationals receiving a meaningful form of protection in Israel is a finite group of approximately 600 refugees from Darfur, which received a group-based form of protection, outside the scope of the Refugee Convention. 122 It is this group view of enemy national asylum seekers that prevents the realization that there is no information linking individual asylum seekers to terrorism or other security threats -as it must have been realized by the authorities who granted status to the 600 Darfurians without any security screening. Moreover, this group view does not allow room for people to identify with the asylum seekers' fear of persecution or harsh feelings towards their governments (which are the enemies of Israel). Finally, this group view does not allow for the feeling of any empathy for the 601st Darfurian, whose need for protection is in no way lesser than the need of those who came to Israel before him.
Third, enemy nationals are typically detained as infiltrators under the Prevention of Infiltration Law, 123 a piece of emergency legislation allegedly applied mostly to enemy nationals. Asylum seekers who are nationals of non-enemy countries are detained under a different law, 124 or, at most, detained under the infiltration law only for a short period of time, before having their detention reframed under a different law. 125 While detention under the emergency legislation is not subject to judicial review, quasi-judicial review was implemented following a habeas corpus petition to the Israeli Supreme Court. 126 This has led in the past to conditional releases of enemy nationals from detention 127 (most typically to employers who employed them in an undocumented manner or under some informal understanding with government officials). 128 Thus, as mentioned above, the enemy national asylum seeker is the most disadvantaged immigrant, as is the Palestinian and Arab immigrant to Israel. Enough attention has not been devoted to the differences between the two groups in the circumstances of their immigration or the norms that govern their rights.
